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Constitutional Protection for
Freedom of Movement: A Time
for Decision
By SHELDON ELLIOT STEINBACH*
I. INTRODUCTION
For all the great purposes for which the Federal Government
was formed, we are one people, with one common country.
We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of
the community, must have the right to pass and repass
through every part of it without interruption, as freely as
in our own States.'
Historically, the tendency towards migration has been funda-
mental to the character of the American people. Yet, the basic
protection for freedom of movement within the continental limits
of the United States is not specifically set forth in the Federal
Constitution. This paper proposes to explore the various legal
concepts and constitutional clauses relied upon by the courts to
protect freedom of movement within the United States.
Interest in the constitutional basis for freedom of travel within
the United States lay dormant until recently when the right to
travel was asserted as an argument against the maintenance of
segregated eating and sleeping facilities, and the continuance of
residency requirements for the receipt of welfare payments.2
Of particular interest is the case of Thompson v. Shapiro,3
o Member of the Maryland and District of Columbia Bars; A.B. John
Hopkins University, 1963; LLB. Columbia University 1966; M.A.P.A. University
of Minnesota, 1968; Member of the firm of Gordon, Feinblatt & Rothman, Balti-
more, Maryland.
' Smith v. Turner (The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 292 (1849).
2 Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1965); Harrell v. Tobriner,
279 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1967); Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa.
1967); Ramos v. Health & Social Serv. Bd., 276 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Wis. 1967);
Green v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967); Thompson v.
Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967).
3270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967).
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presently on appeal to the United States Supreme Court.4 In that
case the plaintiff, an indigent mother, moved from Boston,
Massachusetts to Hartford, Connecticut in order to live near her
mother. Massachusetts welfare authorities discontinued disbursing
welfare payments due to her change in residence. Application to
the Commissioner of Welfare of Connecticut for similar aid was
denied on the ground that she had not met Connecticut's one year
residence requirement which applied to all persons entering the
state without visible means of support for the immediate future.5
The district court held that the one year residence requirement
had a chilling effect on freedom of travel, in violation of the
privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment,
and that it was a denial of equal protection of the law as guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment. This case focused attention once
again on the problem of determining the scope and the consti-
tutional basis for the protection of freedom of movement within
the United States.
Freedom of movement constitutes an important aspect of a
citizen's liberty and has always been basic in the American scheme
of values. The combination of the American tradition of freedom
of movement within the United States, greater economic pros-
perity-which provides financial ability and leisure time and
technological development-which provides the means for rapid
travel, make it imperative that an unquestioned constitutional
basis be established for the preservation of freedom of movement
in its broadest application.
The right to travel freely without deterrence is inherent in
the notion of a unified nation and harkens back to the elementary
principles upon which the country was founded. Freedom of
movement encompasses three separate individual rights: (1) the
right to leave your present location and go elsewhere; (2) the
right to travel without deterrence across various boundaries; and
(3) the right to settle in a place of your choice and remain there.
The United States constitutional development of freedom of
movement has had an English legal basis which in some instances
has resulted in many incongruities by superimposing an under-
4 389 U.S. 1032 (1968). Ed.'s Note: one week prior to JonuR.NAI publication
date this case was decided; Shapiro v. Connecticut, No. 9 (April 21, 1969), voiding
the challenged statute.
5 CoNN. GFN. STAT. ch. 299, §§ 17-20 (1968).
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lying anti-migratory policy upon the laws of the United States. It
has been said that in England the right to personal liberty did not
depend on any express statute, but "was the birthright of every
freeman."' English law fails to provide us with any statutes or
charters which grant the right of unrestricted travel within the
confines of the country.7 Article 42 of the Magna Carta stated
that, "It shall be lawful to any person for the future to go out of
our kingdom, and to return, safely and securely, by land or by
water, saving his allegiance to us, unless it be in time of war ......
Since this provision deals with travel outside the geographic
boundaries of England, rather than internal migration, it is
beyond the scope of our present concern. Blackstone stated in his
Commentaries, that the right of movement embraced "the power
of locomotion, of changing situation, or of moving one's person
to whatsoever place one's inclination may direct without imprison-
ment or restraint, unless by due process of law."s
Many of the various state statutes that inhibit freedom of
movement stem from the Statutes of Labourers which was first
passed in 1349 and amended at various times during the following
200 years.9 These so-called "poor laws" were enacted with the
intent of confining the working class to specific places of residence
and requiring them to work at predetermined wage rates. Legis-
lators were then concerned that wandering bands of workers,
having left their masters, were committing various criminal acts
and as such had to be punished for wandering. Much of the flavor
of those enactments can be seen in Article IV paragraph 1 of the
Articles of Confederation which is set out infra.
There is, however, a distinct difference between the English
and American experience in population migration:
Vast movements of people motivated by urgent economic
need settled this country from Europe, pushed settlement
westward and fed growing cities from rural population re-
servoirs. England's Enclosure Acts, by withdrawing land from
agricultural use, swelled the army of English vagrants;
America invited migration with the lure of free land. The
6 Joseph v. Randolph, 71 Ala. 499, 505 (1882).
7 affee, The Right to Travel: The Passport Problem, 35 FOREIGN AF RAas 177{ffe19r55s (Lws 90)
8 1 BLACSTONE COITARIES 134 (Lewis 3d ed. 1902).
9 See 3 F. STEP=, HssoaY oF T= GRnnAL LA oF ENGLAND 203
(1883).
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same elements of the population who on one side of the
Atlantic were rogues and vagabonds, on the other were
frontiersmen. 10
It can be assumed that the individual's freedom of movement
was not a major issue during the colonial period of American
development. A search of the reports of the Federal Constitutional
Convention of 1787 has disclosed little which is relevant to free-
dom of travel." The Federalist Papers and the debates of the
ratifying conventions gave little attention to the freedom of move-
ment of free citizens. Colonel Mason during the debates on the
terms of admission for new states, described the freedom of travel
which citizens possessed and exercised at the time:
If it were possible by just means to prevent emigrations
to the Western Country it might be good policy.... But go
the people will as they find it for their interest and the best
policy is to treat them with that equality which will make
them friends not enemies.1
2
With the limitless possibilities of expansion and migration, the
removal provisions, based on the older English Poor Laws, had
little effect on the citizenry:
Is free and unrestricted travel, then, a 'right' of Englishmen?
It is nowhere so stated nor granted by formal charter, nor was
it ever an issue in revolutionary times. It has that powerful
yet ambiguous confirmation which comes from a custom
which is taken for granted and upon which so many of the
'rights' and 'freedoms' of Englishmen rest."
Freedom of movement across the country has become part of
the American heritage, taking root in the migrational foundation
of the nation and gaining greater impetus from the ceaseless
migration westward that continues to this day. The concept of
movement has been further shaped by the melting pot character
of our population which has allowed minority elements to enter
a community and take an equal part in its growth. Last of all,
the general absence of legal barriers to movement out of or into
a community has fostered the expansion of travel and of emigra-
1oFoote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REv.
603, 617 (1956).
11 Note, Passports and Freedom of Travel: The Conflict of a Right and a
Privilege, 41 GEo. L.J. 63, 71 (1952).
12S . TRAN SLLE, DocumENms IL rismATrmE OF TmE Fom&TioN OF
UNION OF TE AmIuCAN STATES 638 (1927).
13 Jaffee, supra note 7 at 20.
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tion from state to state. All of these historical aspects have affected
our concept of freedom of movement for the individual.
Yet, the freedom to travel or change residence "is nowhere
granted specific protection and though that is not conclusive, it
suggests that the protection is something less absolute than that,
let us say, of speech of religion. .... -14Mobility may be protected
by one or more of the following legal concepts: (1) the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the several states under the U.S.
Constitution, Article 4, § 2; (2) the power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce; (3) the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States under the fourteenth amendment and (4) the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. All four of these
legal concepts which have in varying degrees contributed to the
constitutional development of the freedom of movement, a free-
dom which over the years has become the keystone of American
society and which is essential to its economic growth.
II. PRIVILEGE AND IMMUNITIES PROVISION OF ARTICLE IV § 2:
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.
Article IV of the Articles of Confederation stated that:
To better secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and inter-
course among people of different States in this Union, the free
inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and
fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all pri-
vileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States;
the people of each State shall have free ingress and egress to
and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the
privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties,
impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof re-
spectively.
Although it is difficult to establish the exact intent of the
framers of the Constitution with respect to the abbreviation of
the older form of Article IV, we do have the words of Charles
Pickney, the purported drafter of Article IV § 2, stating that it
had been "formed exactly upon the principles of the 4th article
of the present confederation." 15
14 Id.
15 M. FAu,.Atn, THE RECOmBS OF r=r FEImAu CONvEN-ION, APPENDX A 112
(1911).
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The first and leading case judicially construing the meaning
of Article IV § 2 of the Constitution is Corfield v. Coryell,16
decided in the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania in
1825. The court addressed itself to the question, what are the
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states? Mr.
Justice Washington stated:
We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those
privileges and immunities which are in their nature funda-
mental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free
governments, and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by
citizens of the several States which compose this Union,
from the time of their becoming free, independent and sov-
ereign .... The right of a citizen of one state to pass through,
or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agri-
culture, professional pursuits or otherwise ... may be men-
tioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of
citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general de-
scription of privileges deemed to be fundamental .... 17
Whether there is a privilege of free ingress and egress under
Article IV § 2 which allows a citizen of one state to travel and re-
side anywhere he wishes has not yet been directly decided by the
Supreme Court. However, there are dicta to the effect that such
a privilege exists. The Supreme Court illustrated the absolute
right derived from Article IV § 2 in Paul v. Virginia:18
It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to
place the citizens of each State upon the same footing with
citizens of other States, so far as the advantages resulting
from citizenship in those States are concerned. It relieves
them from the disabilities of alienage in other States; it gives
them the right of free ingress into other States and egress
from the right of free ingress into other States and egress from
During the early 1920's there was widespread explusion of the
possessed by the citizens of those States in the acquisition and
enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness .... 19
The Court in Ward v. Maryland,20 set aside a state license tax that
discriminated in favor of resident traders, as being in conflict with
the constitutional protection of citizens of each state with respect
16 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3280) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1828).
17 Id. at 551-52.
1875 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
19 Id. at 180.
2079 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870).
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to the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.
Mr. Justice Clifford stated that,
[b] eyond doubt those words are words of very comprehen-
sive meaning, but it will be sufficient to say that the clause
plainly and unmistakably secures and protects the right of a
citizen of one State of the Union for the purpose of engaging
in lawful commerce, trade, or business without molesta-
tion .... 21
During the early 1920's there was widespread explusion of the
members of the I.W.W. The notorious Bisbee deportations were
noted in the case of United States v. Wheeler 22 where two hundred
and twenty-one citizens of the United States were forcibly removed
from Arizona to New Mexico. The Supreme Court held that the
expulsion had not been state action but the action of private
individuals, and that Article IV § 2 dealt only with discriminatory
state action. Chief Justice White stated that,
[i]n all the States from the beginning down to the adoption
of the Articles of Confederation the citizens thereof possessed
the fundamental right, inherent in citizens of all free govern-
ments, peacefully to dwell within the limits of their re-
spective States, to move at will from the limits of their re-
spective States, to move from place to place therein, to have
free ingress thereto and egress therefrom, with a consequent
authority in the States to punish violations of this fundamental
right.23
The Corfield v. Corywell and Paul v. Virginia pattern was fol-
lowed by several state cases. In Commonwealth v. Milton,2 4 the
Kentucky court upheld the power of the City of Lexington, acting
under an act of the state legislature, to impose a license tax on
the agent of a foreign insurance company. Judge Marshall in
speaking of Article IV § 2 said,
[t]he clause secures to the citizens of each State in every
other State, not the laws or the particular privileges which
they may be entitled to in their own State, but such pro-
211d. at 430.
22 254 U.S. 281 (1920).
23 Id. at 293. "Whatever continuing validity Wheeler may have as restricted
to its own facts, the dicta relied on by the District Court in the present case have
been discredited in subsequent decisions." United States v. Guest, A&&*9., 16 L.
ed. 239, 250n.16 (1966).
24 51 Ky. (12 B. Mon.) 212 (1851).
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tection and benefit of the lavs of any and every other State,
as are common to the citizens thereof, [by] virtue of their
being citizens.. . .The Constitution certainly intended to
secure to every citizen of every State the right of traversing
at will the territory of any and every other State, subject
only to the laws applicable to its own citizens .... 2
The natural rights concept laid down by Justice Washington was
enunciated again in Joseph v. Randolph,26 where a license tax
on persons who employed laborers for the purpose of exporting
them was held invalid:
There can be no denial of the general proposition that every
citizen of the United States, and every citizen of each State of
the Union as an attribute of personal liberty has the right,
ordinarily, of free transit from, or through the territory of
any State. This freedom of egress and ingress is guaranteed to
all by the clearest implications of the Federal, as well as the
State Constitution. 7
Although Hamilton said in the Federalist Papers that the
privileges and immunities clause "may be esteemed to be the
basis of the union,"28 and while the language may leave room for
much broader interpretation, "the court has limited it to mean
that citizens of state A are entitled to stand on a footing of
of equality with citizens of state B in the enjoyment of privileges
and immunities under the laws of state B."29 The clause has in
recent years been limited to dealing with the matter of state dis-
crimination. Stated simply, Article IV § 2 "prevents a State from
discriminating against citizens of other States in favor of its
own."8 0
Thus there has been no argument sustained that the privileges
and immunities clause of Article IV § 2 contains the guarantee
of an absolute right to freedom of movement. Ten Broek3l has
advanced several reasons why Article IV § 2 has not received
judicial acceptance as the protector of the right of free movement.
25 Id. at 218.
2671 Ala. 499 (1882).
27 Id. at 505.
28 THE FEDERALIST No. 80 at 502 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (Hamilton).
29 Comment, State Control of Interstate Migration of Indigents, 40 MICH. L.
REv. 711, 718 (1942).
30 Hague v. C.I.O., 807 U.S. 496, 511 (1939).
81 J. TEx BROEK, THE CONsTrrUTION AND Tns lIGHT OF FRm MovExn'T
12 (1955).
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Initially, if the language of Article IV § 2 encompasses the same
meaning as Article IV of the Articles of Confederation, then
paupers and vagabonds would be excepted contrary to the ruling
in Edwards v. California.3 2 Secondly, the language of the Article
itself doesn't really suggest the process of travel from one state to
another. Furthermore, the provision emphasizes and guarantees
state, not national, citizenship. Lastly, the clause does not re-
strain the states in dealing with their own citizens whether in the
area of free travel or otherwise. For one or all of the above reasons
the courts have turned away from the privileges and immunities
clause of Article IV and have sought to find protection for the
freedom of movement in other constitutional provisions.
III. COMMERCE CLAUSE: The Power to Regulate Commerce
... Among the Several States ... 33
In Edwards v. California,3 4 it was held that the transportation
of persons across state lines was commerce within the meaning of
the constitutional provision, and thus subject to regulation by
Congress. The predominance of Congress in the field of com-
merce affecting individual migration had an early precedent, but
did not reach its fullest extent until the middle of the Twentieth
Century.
One of the first cases partially invoking the Commerce Clause
involved the transportation of slaves. Prior to the Civil War the
slaveholding states, living under the constant fear of a slave
rebellion, adopted legislation geared towards excluding from the
confines of their states free Negroes, whether hailing from abroad
or from sister states. In 1823, a South Carolina statute directed at
this particular problem was declared as contrary to the Commerce
Clause and certain treaties.3 5
Exclusion of paupers was upheld at an early date in Mayor of
New York v. Miln,36 involving a New York statute requiring
32314 U.S. 160 (1941). In this case the court struck down a state statute
making it a misdemeanor to knowingly bring an indigent nonresident into the
state and held that freedom of travel is protected against state abridgement by
the Commerce Clause.
33 U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8.
34314 U.S. 160 (1941).
35Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (No. 4366) (C.C.D.S.C. 1823).
8636 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
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masters of incoming vessels to report the names, place of birth
and last legal settlement of each of their passengers. The Court
said,
[w] e think it as competent and as necessary for a state to pro-
vide precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of
paupers, vagabonds and possibly convicts, as it is to guard
against the physical pestilence which may arise from unsound
and infectious articles imported or from a ship, the crew of
which may be laboring under an infectious disease.
37
This case bolstered the theory that the exclusion of the "moral
pestilence of paupers" is a valid exercise of the state's police power
and does not run contrary to congressional power to regulate
commerce.
In another area, state quarantine and health laws have been
upheld as a valid exercise of the state's police power despite the
fact that those laws tend to limit people who are moving in inter-
state commerce.
38
The full reach of the Commerce Clause was achieved in
Edwards v. California39 in 1941. A California statute made it a
misdemeanor to bring or assist "in bringing into the State any
indigent person who is not a resident of the State knowing him to
be an indigent person. ' 40 A California resident brought a jobless
relative across the state line to help him get a new start in life
and received a six month sentence for doing so. Mr. Justice
Byrnes speaking for the majority, set aside the conviction on the
ground that the section of the statute was an unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce and found it "unnecessary to
decide whether the Section is repugnant to other provisions of
the constitution."141 Two concurring opinions, supported by four
justices, treated the right of free movement as an incident of
national citizenship protected by the fourteenth amendment, an
issue which will be dealt with later. California had argued that
the huge influx of migrants resulted in staggering problems of
health, morals and finance. California also relied on the long-
established law that each community was responsible for the relief
37 Id. at 142.3sCompagnie Francaise v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902).
39 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
40 CAL. WELFARE & INsTrrUTiONs CODE § 2615 (McKinney 1938).
41 14 U.S. at 177.
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of its own indigents and that states might interfere with interstate
transportation of paupers. The theory of the Elizabethian Poor
Laws was no longer considered to fit the facts. Justice Byrnes
stated that,
[w] e do not now think that it would be seriously contended
that because a person is without employment and without
funds he constitutes a 'moral pestilence.' Poverty and im-
morality are not synonymous.42
He further quoted from Baldwin v. Seelig43 which stated that the
Constitution
...was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the
several States must sink or swim together, and that in the long
run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.44
The Edwards decision thus ended the authority of the Miln
case by invalidating the state police power theory on which it
was based. At that time twenty-seven other states scattered across
the United States had similar Anti-Migrant laws which were also
invalidated by the Court's decision.
45
The Court invoked a unity principle in conjunction with a
threat of retaliation in reaching the Edwards result: "The prohi-
bition against transporting indigent non-residents into one State
is an open invitation to retaliatory measures, and the burdens
upon the transportation of such persons becomes cumulative." 46
The question remains as to how great an extent the Supreme
Court has placed the protection of the right of free movement in
the Commerce Clause? States lack the constitutional power to
regulate matters in interstate commerce which are national in
concern and which are capable of uniform regulation.4  However,
the corollary of this rule has left a residum of regulatory power
in the states, in the absence of conflicting legislation by congress.
Under this corollary, matters which are of purely local concern
and which, because of the numbers and diversity of situations in-
volved, do not lend themselves to a uniform rule are still areas
to be regulated by the state. However states which have always
42/Id.
43294 U.S. 511 (1935).
441d. at 523.45 See Note, Depression Migrants and the States, 53 IAv. L. RE . 1031
(1940).
46 314 U.S. at 176.
47 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 143 (1851).
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legislated concerning paupers can no longer argue that the matter
is of purely local concern. Interstate migration is national in scope
and requires a uniform rule or it will burden commerce. But
states can still regulate interstate travel under quarantine laws.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren reaffirmed this power in Zemel v.
Rusk4s stating that the freedom of travel
. . . does not mean that areas ravaged by flood, fire or
pestilence cannot be quarantined when it can be demon-
strated that unlimited travel to the area would directly and
materially interfere with the safety and welfare of the area
or the nation as a whole.49
With the residuary power in the states, the freedom of indivi-
dual movment is not fully protected by the Commerce Clause.
Lastly, if freedom of travel is only protected by the Commerce
Clause, then mobility is a privilege held only by the grace of the
federal government. ° Congress with its power granted by the
Commerce Clause could terminate or limit any movement in
interstate commerce. The federal government through Congress
could, by its own concepts of social engineering choose to regulate
the migration of paupers, potential rioters or others whereby it
would keep them in one area for economic and political reasons.
Should we ever experience another economic collapse or any
sustained civil disorder it is conceivable that maintaining the
stability of population in certain areas would be a legitimate goal
of congressional legislation.
If protection of movement can only be found in the Com-
merce Clause, then it is a right that is held subject to the action
of the legislative body. Congress would then have the power to
expand, regulate, curtail or obliterate the right of free movement
when in their judgment they deemed it wise to do so.
IV. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: .. . No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States....
The first case that intimated that the existence of the right to
48881 U.S. 1 (1965).
49 Id. at 16-17.
50 On this and other provisions covering freedom of movement, see also
Vestal Freedom of Movement, 41 IowA L. RIv. 6 (1955).
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travel was a privilege of national citizenship was actually decided
before the formal enactment of the fourteenth amendment. In
December, 1867, the Supreme Court held in Crandall v. Nevada5'
that a Nevada capitation tax of one dollar levied on all passengers
for the privilege of leaving the State was unconstitutional. Speak-
ing for the majority, Justice Miller maintained that the national
government had at all times the right to require the service of its
citizens at the seat of government. The citizen, he said, has
... the right to come to the seat of government to assert any
claim he may have upon that government, or transact any
business he may have with it. To seek its protection, to share
its offices, to engage in administering its functions. He has a
right of free access to its seaports, through which all the
operations of foreign trade and commerce are conducted, to
the sub-treasuries, the land offices, the revenue offices and
the courts of justice in the several States, and this right is in
its nature independent of the will of the any State over whose
soil he must pass in the exercise of it.52
There is no evidence in the case that the persons involved were
going to the seat of national government. Justice Miller demon-
strated by the illustrations above and others mentioned in his
opinion, the danger and damage which would ensue if the
individual states had the power to prevent or impede the free
movement of individuals from one state to another. Thus before
the promulgation of the fourteenth amendment there was sub-
stantial evidence that the right of free movement was a right of
national citizenship.
Justice Clifford in a concurring opinion preferred to hold the
tax invalid as an encroachment on the federal power to regulate
interstate commerce. He stated, that "strong doubts are enter-
tained by me whether Congress possesses the power to levy any
such tax. . . .," but he said affirmatively "I am clear that the
State legislature cannot impose any such burden upon commerce
among the several States." 53 Clifford thus took the initial step in
an issue that still exists at the present time. Does the fourteenth
amendment as applied to freedom of travel occupy a more pro-
tected position in our constitutional framework?
5173 U.S. (6 WaJ.) 85 (1867).
521d. at 44.
53 Id. at 49.
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The first court decision on the privileges and immunities clause
of the fourteenth amendment strictly limited its application. The
majority in the Slaughter House Cases54 held that the only interests
protected by the privileges and immunities clause were those
growing out of the relationship between the citizen and national
government and that the clause could not be used to impose
federal controls over the activities of state governments. This
narrow interpretation made the privileges and immunities clause
a virtual nullity. The majority recognized that some privileges
and immunities owe their existence to the federal government and
its national character and went on to discuss the statement of
Justice Miller in Crandall v. Nevada quoted above.55
In later years the Supreme Court sporadically talked about
some protection for the freedom of movement encompassed with-
in the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. A Georgia revenue act laid a specific tax on the occupation
of an immigrant agent, a person engaged in hiring laborers to be
employed beyond the limits of the state. The Court in Williams
v. Fears56 held that the levy of such a tax did not amount to an
interference with the freedom of movement, as to violate the
federal constitution. The Court felt that "the business was of
such nature and importance as to justify the exercise of the police
power in its regulation."57 However, the Court saw fit to promote
the fourteenth amendment as a protector of the right of travel.
"Undoubtedly," they said,
[t] he right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place
to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal
liberty, and the right, ordinarly, of free transit from or through
the territory of any State is a right secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment and by other provisions of the Constitution.
58
Again in 1908 when discussing the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States the Court stated that "among the
rights and privileges of National citizenship recognized by this
court is the right to pass freely from State to State. . .. "59
The privileges and immunities clause had a short lived ap-
5483 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
55 Id at 79.
56 179 U.S. 270 (1900)
57 Id. at 275.
58 Id. at 274.
59 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908).
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plication in Colgate v. Harvey60 when the Court declared that the
right to lend money in any part of the country was a privilege and
immunity of national citizenship which may not be abridged by
state action. This case was overruled five years later in the 1940
case of Madden v. Kentucky6 ' where it was held that the right to
deposit money in foreign banks was not a privilege or immunity
of national citizenship.
In the meanwhile the strength of the Crandall case was being
eroded. Dictum in United States v. Wheeler 2 attempted to limit
the Crandall decision to a holding that the statute in question
directly burdened "the performance by the United States of its
governmental functions" and limited the "rights of citizens grow-
ing out of such functions."0 3 The authority of Crandall was weak-
ened further in 1929 in Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky64 where
it was held that for a state "[t] o impose a tax on the transit of
passengers . . . between states is to regulate commerce and is
beyond state power. . . .," Justice Sutherland adding that the
rule of the Crandall case "so far as it is to the contrary, has not
been followed."0' 5 Thus the right to pass from state to state as a
privilege of national citizenship needed rejuvenation if it was
to be a viable constitutional concept.
The privileges and immunities clause as the protector of the
right of mobility was resurrected by four justices in Edwards v.
California.66 As already noted, the majority chose to place its re-
liance on the Commerce Clause in ruling the California statute
unconstitutional. Four justices saw "[T]he right to move freely
from State to State . . . [as] .. .an incident of national citizen-
ship protected by the privileges and immunities clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment against State interference. 0n7 In one
of the two concurring opinions Mr. Justice Douglas argued that
to except paupers from the right to freedom of movement would
... contravene every conception of national unity. It would
also introduce a caste system utterly incompatible with the
60296 U.S. 404 (1935).
01309 U.S. 83 (1940).
02254 U.S. 281 (1920).
03 Id. at 299.
64 279 U.S. 245 (1929).
65 Id. at 251.
66 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
07 Id. at 178 (concurring opinion).
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spirit of our system of government. It would permit those who
were stigmatized by a state as indigents, paupers, or vaga-
bonds to be relegated to an inferior class of citizenship. It
would prevent a citizen because he was poor from seeking
new horizons in other States. It might thus withhold from
large segments of our people that mobility which is basic to
any guarantee of freedom of opportunity. The result would be
a substantial dilution of the rights of national citizenship, a
serious impairment of the principles of equality.68
Justices Black and Murphy both joined in this opinion by Justice
Douglas which also tried to resuscitate the Crandall case when
they cited it for the proposition that freedom of movement "was
recognized as a right fundamental to the national character of our
Federal government,"'6 9 before the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment.
In a second concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Jackson a
similar plea was heard for injecting further meaning into the
privileges and immunities clause. He advocated that the Court
should
hold squarely that it is a privilege of citizenship of the
United States, protected from state abridgement, to enter
any state of the Union, either for temporary sojourn or for
the establishment of permanent residence therein and for
gaining resultant citizenship thereof. If national citizenship
means less than this, it means nothing .... 70
Thus both concurring opinions were based on the ground that
it denied a national privilege of free ingress and egress.
The doctrine expounded by Justice Douglas in Edwards has
not yet gained majority standing, mainly due to the reluctance of
a number of justices to expand the concept of national citizenship.
"The reluctance has been due to the fear of creating constitutional
refuges [sic] for a host of rights historically subject to regula-
tion."71 The fear in its simplest form is that an enlarged inter-
pretation of the privileges and immunities clause would expand
judicial control over state action.
In the area of freedom of movement, state action after the
Edwards case was obliterated in the face of the commerce power.
68 Id. at 181.
69 Id. at 178.
to Id. at 183.
't1 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 250 (1964).
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However, Justice Douglas maintained that this freedom should
have a preferred position that would be above regulation by both
state and federal government:
. . . I am of the opinion that the right of persons to move
freely from state to state occupies a more protected position
in our constitutional system than does the movement of
cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state lines.
72
The federal district court in Thompson v. Shapiro73 followed
Justice Jackson's rationale, under the privileges and immunities
clause of the fourteenth amendment, in holding that no enactment
which would restrict an individual's freedom of travel on the
ground of indigence could be upheld as constitutional. The court
further agreed with Justice Jackson that the right of interstate
movement embodies not only the right to pass through a state
but also the right to establish a residence therein.7-
The majority in Thompson stated that previous "right to
travel cases" involved absolute prescriptions on travel, but inter-
preted the language in United States v. Guest75 to mean that the
discouragement of interstate travel was similarly forbidden. The
court proceeded to cite Dombrowski v. Pfister7 6 and Wolff v.
Selective Service Local Board No. 16, 77 to apply the above proposi-
tion by analogy, to unconstitutional actions which had a "chilling"
effect on first amendment freedoms. Since the one year residence
requirement was found to have a chilling effect on the right of
movement, the court concluded that the enactment was un-
constitutional.
The Court in Thompson clearly raised the right of freedom
of movement to a preferred position by analogizing the right to
that of free speech and association and confirmed that the only
provision under which freedom of travel could be adequately pro-
tected and given a preferred position is under the privileges and
immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment.
72Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941).
73 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967).
74 Id. at 336.
75 383 U.S. 745 (1966), where the Court held that freedom of travel is pro-
tected against interference by individuals as well as governments.
76380 U.S. 479 (1965), where the Court enjoined state officials from using
state subversive control laws to discourage freedom of speech and association.
77 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967), where the Court held that reclassification of
a student's draft status based on his participation in anti-war demonstration had
a detrimental effect on freedom of speech.
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V. DUE PROCESS OF LAW OF FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law
There is little case law and only some dicta which construe the
due process clause as protecting persons in their right to free in-
gress and egress among the states. One of the few statements that
combines freedom of movement and due process is found in
Williams v. Fears:
78
The liberty, of which the deprivation without due process
of law is forbidden, means not only the right of the citizen
to be free from mere physical restraint of his person, as by
incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of
the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to
be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where
he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling .... 79
The concept that the prohibition of interstate migration
would be a valid exercise of state police power was ended when
Justice Byrnes stated in Edwards that the California statute was
"not a valid exercise of the police power of California."80 The
outcome of the future clash between the due process clause and
the state police power cannot now be predicted. All that is
presently available to us is the past experience of our consti-
tutional structure under the stress of war.
The evacuation of Japanese Americans during World War II
and their relocation in detention centers brought to the fore-
front the issue of freedom to remain where you are and go where
you please. The Court felt that under the stress of war conditions
and pressing public necessity American citizens could be removed
from their homes without notice, hearing or fair trial.81 In the
case of Ex parte Endo8 2 the Court invalidated relocation center
detention for persons whose loyalty was conceded. Although the
majority refused to face the constitutional issue, a concurring
opinion by Mr. Justice Roberts stated that,
78 179 U.S. 270 (1900).
79 Id. at 274.
80 314 U.S. at 177.
81 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
82323 U.S. 283 (1944).
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[t]he Court is squarely faced with a serious constitutional
question-whether the relators detention violated the guar-
antees of the Bill of Rights of the federal constitution and
especially the guarantee of due process of law. There can be
but one answer to that question. An admittedly loyal citizen
has been deprived of her liberty for a period of years.
Under the Constitution she should be free to come and go
as she pleases. Instead, her liberty of motion and other in-
nocent activities have been prohibited and conditioned.
83
Professor Chaffee in his study of "Freedom of Movement"
8 4
finds both the privileges and immunities approach and the com-
merce clause approach lacking and concluded that:
[T]his valuable human right is best seen in due process
terms: already in several decisions the Court has used the
Due Process Clause to safeguard the right of the members of
any race to reside where they please inside a state, regardless
of ordinances and injunctions. Why is not this clause equally
available to assure the right to live in any state one desires?
And unreasonable restraints by the national government on
mobility can be upset by the Due Process Clause in the Fifth
Amendment.... Thus the 'liberty' of all human beings which
cannot be taken away without due process of law includes
liberty of speech, press, assembly, religion, and also liberty
of movement.8 5
The Supreme Court has utilized the due process clause pri-
marily in the area of passports and foreign travel:
The right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen
cannot be deprived without due process of law under the
Fifth Amendment.... Freedom of movement across frontiers
in either direction, and inside frontiers as well, was a part of
our heritage. Travel abroad, like travel within the country,
may be necessary for a livelihood. It may be as close to the
heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears,
or reads. Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of
values. ... Freedom of travel is indeed an important aspect
of the citizen's 'liberty.'86
83 Id. at 310.
84 Z. CHAE, TmsE HurAN Ricars iN T CoNsTrruTroN OF 1787 162
(1956).
85 Id. at 192-93.
86Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-27 (1958). See also Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
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Freedom of movement has been and continues to be one of the
basic elements of American society. Among the several reasons for
the formation of the United States was to facilitate commercial
intercourse and to indirectly ostablish intellectual, cultural,
scientific, social and political interchange between neighboring
individuals. Although the reasons for fostering migrations may
have been altered somewhat over the years, it is still a major con-
cern to all citizens that the personality of the individual be de-
veloped to its fullest extent. It is evident that individual develop-
ment is facilitated by the elimination of barriers to the free flow
of peoples and the ideas that accompany them. It has been noted
that one of the first acts of a dictatorial regime is to repress the
freedom of movement of individuals, as that freedom is as
dangerous to tryants as is freedom of speech or assembly, and is
controlled with equal vigor in the interest of internal security.
87
As noted above, there is no explicit constitutional provision
guaranteeing the right of interstate movement and the courts have
never established by any unanimous decision what the consti-
tutional basis will be for the protection of the freedom of move-
ment. The last pronouncement on the subject by the Supreme
Court quite aptly summarizes the present situation: "Although
there have been recurring differences in emphasis within the Court
as to the source of the constitutional right of interstate travel,
there is no need here to canvass those differences further. All have
agreed that the right exists."881 The Thompson court noted "the
Court thereby quieted any doubts that have remained about the
existence of the constitutional right of interstate travel but left
unanswered questions regarding its source and dimensions. ' 89
Article IV § 2 places greatest emphasis on state rather than
national citizenship and does not restrain the states in dealing
with their own citizens-with regard to freedom of movement or
otherwise. The commerce clause has gained widest acceptance as
the constitutional protector for travel. Yet, four justices in
Edwards found this basis unsatisfactory for what amounts to sub-
stantial reasons. To place this valuable human right under the
protective covering of the commerce clause will lay bare this
87Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 518 (1964) (concurring
opinion).
88 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 (1966).
8 9 Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331, 335 (D. Conn. 1967).
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right to political manipulation by the legislative body which could
expand, regulate, curtail or obliterate it to meet the exigencies of
the moment. The due process clause has been frequently invoked
to protect the right of freedom of foreign travel, without ever
being applied to internal movement. Liberty of movement, under
the theory invoked by proponents of this clause, would be elevated
to the same class as liberty of speech and assembly and any un-
reasonable restraints by government would fall in the face of the
due process clause. Although this approach is somewhat ap-
pealing, the Japanese relocation experience gives rise to grave
doubt as to the degree of protection afforded by this clause in
national emergencies.
The privileges and immunities of the fourteenth amendment
speaks to the entire issue of freedom of movement in its fullest
scope and could have sufficient breadth to give the protection
that the right of travel and of establishing a residence rightly
deserves. The amendment speaks of "privileges as an American
citizen."9 0 The language lends itself to the interpretation that
uninterrupted interstate travel could be regarded as a privilege
and immunity of national citizenship, a concept that may well
have been realized by the founding fathers as a method of break-
ing down state provincialism and facilitating the creation of a
true federal union.
The primary judicial resistance to the establishment of the
right of movement as a privilege and immunity of national
citizenship stems from a fear of creating constitutional refugees
for rights formally subject to regulation. Freedom of movement,
however, is an appropriate right to be given a preferred position,
as Mr. Justice Jackson stated in his concurrence in Edwards:
... [I]t is a privilege of citizenship of the United States,
protected from state abridgment, to enter any state of the
Union, either for temporary sojourn or for the establishment
of permanent residence therein and for gaining resultant
citizenship thereof. If national citizenship means less than
this, it means nothing.91
Constant movement in America is apparent from the early
immigrants moving West, to the present-day flow of persons from
90 Oyama v. California, 382 U.S. 633, 640 (1948).
91314 U.S. at 183.
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rural or depressed areas to the urban centers. Any barriers which
impede the fullest possibility of individual movement curtail
liberty as well as economic development. Residence requirements
for the receipt of welfare payments, for example, among other
state regulatory schemes, curtail mobility. As such it punishes an
individual who takes the initiative to move to find employment,
ultimately inhibiting the individual from seeking employment
outside of his home, often a depressed area, for fear that if he
is unable to secure work in the new location, there will be no
means of support for himself and his family because of a failure
to fulfill the residence requirements for the receipt of benefits.
Surely national citizenship can mean no less than the right of
each and every citizen to travel anywhere within the continental
limits of the United States and to establish a residence anywhere
therein with no state or federal law impeding his progress
toward his fullest social and economic development. If the courts
will adopt the concept of national citizenship under the privilege
and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, as it in-
corporates the right of movement, then that human right will have
the protection it rightly needs and deserves.
